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Abstract
What is the impact of real estate prices on corporate investment? In the presence
of financing frictions, firms use pledgeable assets as collateral to finance new projects.
Through this collateral channel, shocks to the value of real estate can have a large impact
on aggregate investment. Over the 1993-2007 period, the representative U.S. corporation
invests $.06 out of each $1 of collateral. To compute this sensitivity, we use local variations
in real estate prices as shocks to the collateral value of firms that own real estate. We
address the endogeneity of local real estate prices using the interaction of interest rates
and local constraints on land supply as an instrument. We address the endogeneity of the
decision to own land (1) by controlling for observable determinants of ownership and (2)
by looking at the investment behavior of firms before and after they acquire land. The
sensitivity of investment to collateral value is stronger the more likely a firm is to be credit
constrained.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of contract incompleteness, Barro (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Hart
and Moore (1994) point out that collateral pledging enhances a firm’s debt capacity. Providing
outside investors with the option to liquidate pledged assets ex post acts as a strong disciplining
device on borrowers. This, in turn, eases financing ex ante. Asset liquidation values thus
play a key role in the determination of a firm’s financing capacity. This simple observation
has important macroeconomic consequences: as noted by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), business downturns will deteriorate assets values, thus reducing
debt capacity and depressing investment, which will amplify the downturn. This “collateral
channel” is often the main suspect for the severity of the Great Depression (Bernanke (1983)) or
for the extraordinary expansion of the Japanese economy at the end of the 80’s (Cutts (1990)).
In the current context of abruptly declining real estate prices in the U.S., an assessment of the
relevance of this “collateral channel” is called for. This paper attempts to empirically uncover
the microeconomic foundation for this mechanism.
We show that over the 1993-2007 period, a $1 increase in collateral value leads the rep-
resentative U.S. public corporation to raise its investment by $.06. This sensitivity can be
quantitatively important in the aggregate. This is because real estate represents a sizable frac-
tion of the tangible assets that firms hold on their balance sheet. As we show in this paper, in
1993, among public firms in the US, 58% reported at least some real estate ownership. Among
these land-owning firms, our estimation of the value of real estate holdings represented some
20% of shareholder value.
To get at this $.06 sensitivity, we use variations in local real estate prices, either at the state
or the city level, as shocks to the collateral value of land holding firms. We measure how a firm’s
investment responds to each additional dollar of real estate that the firm actually owns, and not
how investment responds to real estate shocks overall. This empirical strategy uses two sources
of identification. The first comes from the comparison, within a local area, of the sensitivity of
investment to real estate prices across firms with and without real estate. The second comes
from the comparison of investment by land holding firms across areas with different variations
in real estate prices. The methodology is similar to Case et al. (2001) in their study of home
wealth effects on household consumption.
Two sources of endogeneity might affect our estimation. First, real estate prices may be
correlated with the investment opportunities of land holding firms. We instrument local real
estate prices using the interaction of long-term interest rates (to capture time variations in
housing demand) with local housing supply elasticity (see Himmelberg et al., 2005, and Mian
and Sufi, 2009, for a use of these elasticities). The second endogeneity issue is that the decision
to own or lease real estate may be correlated with the firm’s investment opportunities or the
extent of its credit constraints (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009, and Rampini and Vishwanathan,
2010). We do not have a proper set of instruments to deal with this problem, but we make two
attempts at gauging the severity of the bias it may cause. We first control for the observable
determinants in the ownership decision, which leaves the estimation unchanged. Second, we
estimate the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for firms that acquire real estate
before and after they do so. Before acquiring real estate, future purchasers are statistically
indistinguishable from firms that never own real estate. The sensitivity of their investment to
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real estate prices becomes large, positive and significant only after they acquire real estate.
This paper is a contribution to the emerging empirical literature on collateral and investment.
The seminal paper in this literature is Peek and Rosengreen (1997), who look at the supply side
of credit. During the collapse of the Japanese real estate bubble in the early 1990s, they show
that banks owning depreciated real estate assets cut their credit supply in the US, leading to
a decrease in their clients’ investment.1 Closest to our paper is Jie Gan (2007a) who shows
that land holding Japanese firms were more affected by the burst of the real estate bubble in
the beginning of the 90s than firms with no real estate. By contrast, our identification rests on
“normal” real estate market conditions over nearly 20 years of data. Our estimates thus reflect
“normal” firm behavior and not the response to the collapse of one of the largest property bubbles
in History. Besides, we address some of the shortcomings of her important study. First, since
she focuses on a single macro event, her estimates are vulnerable to confounding macro-effects
(exchange rate variations, stock market collapse, etc.).2 Second, we study the US, an economy
where banks, and hence collateral, may play a smaller role. Another advantage of looking at
the US is that our paper uses widely available data and our methodology is easy to implement
in future research.3
Finally, our paper is also closely related to recent work that try to highlight the role of
collateral in financial contracts. Benmelech, et al. (2005) document that more liquid (or more
“redeployable”) pledgeable assets are financed with loans of longer maturities and durations.
Benmelech and Bergman (2008) documents how U.S. airline companies are able to take advan-
tage of lower collateral value to renegotiate ex post their lease obligation downward. Finally,
Benmelech and Bergman (2009) construct industry-specific measures of redeployability and show
that more redeployable collateral leads to lower credit spreads, higher credit ratings, and higher
loan-to-value ratios. While we do not go into such details in the examination of financial con-
tracts, our paper contributes to this literature by empirically emphasizing the importance of
collateral for financing and investment decisions.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the construction of
the data and summary statistics. Section 3 describes our main empirical results on investment
and capital structure decisions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
We use accounting data on US listed firms, merged with real estate prices at the state and
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.
1Gan (2007b) also uses the Japanese crisis as a shock to banks health and identifies the importance of bank
health on their clients’ investment.
2One of her robustness checks looks at cross-sectional variations in land prices, but, as pointed out in the
paper, the dispersion of price changes in the cross section is too small to provide meaningful identification.
3Another contribution looking at collateral shocks triggered by the Japanese crisis can be found in Goyal and
Yamada (2001).
4For other contributions emphasizing the role of collateral in boosting pledgeable income, see, among others,
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) and Rampini and Viswanathan (2010)
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2.1 Accounting Data
We start from the sample of active COMPUSTAT firms in 1993 with non-missing total assets
(COMPUSTAT item #6). This provides us with a sample of 9,211 firms and a total of 83,719
firm-year observations over the period 1993 - 2007. We keep firms whose headquarters are located
in the United States and exclude from the sample firms operating in the finance, insurance,
real estate, construction and mining industries, as well as firms involved in a major takeover
operation. We keep firms that appear at least three consecutive years in the sample. This leaves
us with a sample of 5,121 firms and 51,467 firm year observations.
2.1.1 Real Estate Assets
We collect data on the value of real estate assets of each firm. After measuring the initial market
value of real estate assets of each firm, we will identify variations in their value coming from
variations in real estate prices across space and over time.
First, we measure the market value of real estate assets. Following Nelson et al. (1999),
three major categories of property, plant and equipments are included in the definition of real
estate assets: Buildings, Land and Improvement and Construction in Progress. Unfortunately,
these assets are not marked-to-market, but valued at historical cost. To recover their market
value, we calculate the average age of those assets, and use historical prices to compute their
current market value. The procedure is as follows. The ratio of the accumulated depreciation
of buildings (COMPUSTAT item #253) to the historic cost of buildings (COMPUSTAT item
#263)5 measures the proportion of the original value of a building claimed as depreciation.
Based on a depreciable life of 40 years,6 we compute the average age of buildings for each firm.
Using state-level residential real estate inflation after 1975, and CPI inflation before 1975, we
compute the market value of real estate assets for each year in the sample period (1993-2007).
The accumulated depreciation on buildings is no longer available in COMPUSTAT after
1993.7 This is why, when measuring the value of real estate, we restrict our sample to firms
active in 1993. There are 2,750 firms in 1993 in our sample for which we are able to construct a
measure of the market value of real estate assets and 28,014 corresponding firm-year observations.
Table 1 reveals two striking facts. In 1993, 58% of all US public firms reported some real estate
ownership. Moreover, for the median firm in the entire sample, the market value of real estate
represents 30% of the book value of Property, Plants and Equipment (and 5% of the firm’s total
market value). For the median land holding firm in COMPUSTAT, the market value of real
estate represents 98% of the book value of Property, Plant and Equipment and 19% of the firm’s
total market value. Real estate is thus a sizable fraction of the tangible assets that corporations
hold on their balance sheet.
5Unlike buildings, land and improvements are not depreciated.
6As in Nelson et al. (1999), this assumption can be tested by estimating annual depreciation amounts (as
the change in total depreciation). Building cost, when divided by annual depreciation, provides an estimate of
depreciable life. Although inconsistent, the average life estimated by this approach ranges from 38 to 45 years.
This confirms our assumption of a 40-year-life.
7In 1994, ten of the fifteen schedules required for Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system
(EDGAR) filings were eliminated. In particular, the accumulated depreciation on Buildings is no longer reported.
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Second, to measure accurately how the value of real estate assets evolves, we need to know
the location of these assets. COMPUSTAT does not provide us with the geographic location
of each specific piece of real estate owned by a firm. However, the data reports headquarter
location (variables STATE and COUNTY). We use the headquarter location as a proxy for the
location of real estate. There are two assumptions underlying this choice. First, headquarters
and production facilities tend to be clustered in the same state and MSA. Second, headquarters
represent an important fraction of corporation real estate assets. To support these assumptions,
we manually collected information on the location of a firm’s real estate using their 10K files.
We discuss these data in detail in section 2.3.
2.1.2 Other Accounting Data
Aside from data on real estate, we use other accounting variables, and construct ratios as is
typically done in the corporate finance literature. We compute the investment rate as the ratio
of capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT item #128) to past year’s Property Plant & Equipment
(item #8).8 We compute the Market-to-Book ratio as follows: we take the total market value
of equity as the number of common stocks (item #25) times end-of-year close price of common
shares (item #24). To this, we add the book value of debt and quasi equity, computed as book
value of assets (item #6) minus common equity (item #60) minus deferred taxes (item #74).
We then normalize the resulting firm’s “market” value using book value of assets (item #6). We
also use the ratio of cash flows (item #18 plus item #14) to past year’s PPE (item #8).
We use COMPUSTAT to measure debt issuance. We measure long term debt issues as
long term debt issuance (item #111) normalized by lagged PPE (item #8). We also compute
long term debt repayment (item #114) divided by lagged PPE. Finally, only the net change
in current debt (item #301) is available in COMPUSTAT, and we also normalize it by lagged
PPE. Net change in long term debt is defined as long term issuance minus long term repayments
normalized by PPE. Because data on issuances and repayments are sometimes missing, we also
compute net change in long term debt as the yearly difference in long term debt normalized by
lagged PPE.
In most of the regression analysis, we use initial characteristics of firms to control for the
potential heterogeneity among our 2,750 firms. These controls, measured in 1993, are based on
Return on Assets (operating income before depreciation (item #13) minus depreciation (item
#14) divided by total assets (item #6)), Assets (item #6), Age measured as number of years
since IPO, 2-digit SIC codes and state of location.
Finally, to ensure that our results are statistically robust, all variables defined as ratios
are windsorized at the 5th percentile.9 Table 1 provides summary statistics on most accounting
variables used in the paper. We simply remark that the debt-related variables (Debt Repayment,
Debt Issues, Net Debt Issues and Changes in Current Debt) have high means (.75 for debt issues,
for instance) but fairly low medians (e.g., .01 for debt issues). This is because (1) these variables
8This normalization by PPE is standard in the investment literature (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
or Almeida et al. (2007)). It provides typically a median investment ratio of .21. An alternative specification is
to normalize all variables by lagged asset value (item #6), as in Rauh (2006) for instance, which deliver notably
lower ratios. Our results are robust to this alternative normalization choice.
9Windsorizing at the first percentile or trimming the variables at the 5th/1st percentile does not qualitatively
change our results.
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are normalized by lagged PPE, which is notably smaller than total asset and (2) these variables
are left censored so that they are naturally right-skewed and as a consequence, our windsorizing
methodology still leaves an important mass on the right tail of these distributions.
2.1.3 Ex-Ante Measure of Credit Constraint
The standard empirical approach in the investment literature uses ex ante measures of financial
constraint to sort between “Constrained” and “Unconstrained” firms. Estimations are performed
separately for each set of firms. We follow Almeida et al. (2004) in this approach and define
three measures of credit constraint using the following schemes:
• Payout ratio: In every year over the 1993 - 2007 period, we rank firms based on their payout
ratio and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms in the
bottom (top) three deciles of the annual payout distribution. We compute the payout ratio
as the ratio of total distributions (dividends plus stock repurchases) to operating income.
• Firm Size: In every year over the 1993 - 2007 period, we rank firms based on their total
assets and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms in the
bottom (top) three deciles of the annual asset size distribution.
• Bond Rating: In every year over the 1993 - 2007 period, we retrieve data on bond ratings
assigned by Standard & Poor’s and categorize those firms with debt outstanding but
without a bond rating as financially constrained. Financially unconstrained firms are
those whose bonds are rated.
2.2 Real Estate Data
2.2.1 Real Estate Prices
We use data on residential and commercial real estate prices, both at the state and at the MSA
level.
Residential real estate prices come from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight.1011 The O.F.H.E.O. provides a Home Price Index (HPI), which is a broad measure of the
movement of single-family home prices in the US.12 Because of the breadth of the sample, it
provides more information than is available in other house price indices. In particular, the HPI
is available at the state level since 1975. It is also available for most Metropolitan Statistical Ar-
eas, with a starting date between 1977 and 1987 depending on the MSA considered. We match
the state level HPI with our accounting data using the state identifier from COMPUSTAT. To
10http://www.ofheo.gov/index.asp
11The O.F.H.E.O. is an independent entity within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, whose
primary mission is “ensuring the capital adequacy and financial safety and soundness of two government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) - the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)”.
12The HPI is computed using a hedonic regression and each release of the HPI offers a different value of the
index for a given state year. The results presented in the paper are not, however, significantly different if, for
instance, we use the 2006 release instead of the 2007 release.
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match the MSA level HPI, we aggregate FIPS codes from COMPUSTAT into MSA identifiers
using a correspondence table available from the OFHEO website.
Commercial real estate prices come from Global Real Analytics. This dataset provides a
price index for Offices and Industrial Commercial Real Estate.13 This index is only available for
a subset of 64 MSAs in the U.S. with a starting date between 1985 and 2003.
Table 1 provides details on these indices (that have been normalized to 1 in 2006). The
correlation between the residential and commercial indices at the state level is .57, and .42 at
the MSA level. The correlation between the two residential indices is .86.
2.2.2 Measuring Land Supply
Controlling for the potential endogeneity of local real estate prices in an investment regression is
an important step in our analysis. Following Himmelberg et al. (2005), we instrument local real
estate prices using the interaction of long-term interest rates and local housing supply elasticity.
Local housing supply elasticities are provided by Saiz (2009) and are available for 95 MSAs.
These elasticities capture the amount of developable land in each metro area and are estimated
by processing satellite-generated data on elevation and presence of water bodies. As a measure
of long-term interest rates, we use the “contract rate on 30 year, fixed rate conventional home
mortgage commitments” from the Federal Reserve website, between 1993 and 2007.
2.3 Measurement Issues
The empirical methodology we use in this paper relies on several approximations that introduce
measurement errors in the regression analysis. In this Section, we present evidence in support
of these approximations.
The first approximation we make relates to the location of firms’ real estate assets. We as-
sume that firms own most of their real estate assets in the state (or MSA) where their headquar-
ters are located. We do so because there is no systematic source of information on corporations
“true” location(s). To check the validity of this approximation, we manually collected informa-
tion on the ownership status of a firm’s headquarter from the 10K forms filed with the Security
and Exchange Commission for the year 1997.14 These documents were retrieved from the SEC’s
EDGAR website (http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml). Information on a firm’s headquarters
ownership was available for 4,065 firms in 1997.15 Of those firms, 3,436 firms also have non
missing information on the value of their real estate assets in COMPUSTAT.16
13We use the Offices index in our analysis but the main results are left unchanged if we use the Industrial
index instead.
141997 is the earliest date for which 10K forms are available on the web. We also collected the same information
for the year 2000, which we used in our study of the real estate bubble of the early 2000’s in Section 3.7.
154,065 firms reported in their 10K files a single headquarter. In addition, 164 firms reported 2 distinct
headquarters, and 19 reported 3 or more headquarters. These cases of multiple headquarters seem to typically
correspond to small firms that have both their headquarters in either a small city, or in the suburb of a large
city, and in addition, have an address in a large city that they use primarily as a mailing address (in some of
those 183 cases, we could explicitly identify the address for the second headquarter as a PO box). We dropped
those few observations with multiple headquarters.
16The corresponding numbers for 2000 are: 2,902 firms with non missing real estate information in COMPU-
STAT out of 3,666 firms with available 10K files.
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For those 3,436 firms, it is possible to check how the 10K information on HQ ownership and
the COMPUSTAT information on land ownership match. Table 2 provides the evidence. Of
the 1,606 firms that report owning no real estate assets in COMPUSTAT, only 34 firms (2%)
report owning their headquarters in their 10K forms. Hence, the probability of missing a real
estate owner using COMPUSTAT information is small.
On the other hand, of the 1,830 firms that report owning some real estate assets in COM-
PUSTAT, only 806 (44%) actually report owning their headquarters in their 10K forms.17 The
assumption that all of the real estate assets of a firm are located in its headquarters’ State or
MSA is not validated in the data. However, we remark that this will mechanically lead us to
underestimate the magnitude of our effect. If a firm owns real estate assets outside its head-
quarters’ MSA, we overestimate the fraction of the value of its real estate assets that co-moves
with real estate prices in this MSA. This leads to underestimate the effect of a dollar increase in
collateral value on investment. We point out in Section 3 that using an ownership dummy using
COMPUSTAT information or an ownership dummy using 10K information yields very similar
results. Thus, this particular measurement error does not seem to bias our results significantly.
Second, using the OFHEO residential real estate prices as a proxy for commercial real estate
prices could be a source of noise in our regression. As noted earlier, the correlation between
the two indices ranges from .42 (at the MSA level) to .57 (at the State Level). Moreover, the
commercial index is available only at the MSA level, and for a subset of cities. Therefore, there
is a trade-off: this index corresponds more accurately to the true nature of firms real estate
assets but it relies on the stronger assumption that these assets are mostly located in the city
where headquarters are located. We present evidence using both series of prices (residential and
commercial) and show that our results do not depend on the price index used.
3 Real Estate Prices and Firm Behavior
In this Section we analyze the impact of real estate shocks on corporate investment. Our goal is
to provide an estimate of the financial multiplier (i.e. by how much an increase in assets’ value
increases investment) at the firm-level.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
We run different specifications of a standard investment equation. Specifically, for firm i, at
date t, with headquarters in location l (State or MSA), investment is given by:
INV lit = αi + δt + β.RE V alueit + γP
l
t + controlsit + it (1)
where INV is the ratio of investment to lagged PPE, RE V alueit is the ratio of the market
value of real estate assets in year t to lagged PPE and P lt controls for the level of prices in
location l (State or MSA) in year t.
The interpretation of this reduced form equation is based on a simple model of investment
17Note that a firm may not own its headquarters, but may still own other real estate assets in its headquarters
State or MSA.
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under collateral constraint.18 In the presence of financing constraints, at least a fraction of firms
will use their pledgeable assets as collateral to finance their investment. A constrained firm will
borrow a fraction the collateral value of all its pledgeable assets. Conditional on not defaulting
on its debt at the end of a period, a firm will repay its debt, and then use its collateral again to
finance investment in the subsequent period. This model justifies our choice of regressing the
annual investment of a firm on the current market value of its entire stock of real estate assets.
The estimated coefficient βˆ is a composite measure of the fraction of firms in the sample that
face financing constraints, the severity of these financing constraints, and the fraction of the
value of real estate assets that can be used as collateral. If the coefficient βˆ is positive, then at
least some firms face financing constraints. In a reduced form, this coefficient βˆ measures, for
the average firm in the sample, the fraction of its collateral that is used to finance investment.
As is typically done in the reduced-form investment literature, we control for the ratio of cash
flows to PPE and the one year lagged market to book value of assets. We also include a firm
fixed effect αi, as well as year fixed effects δt, designed to capture aggregate specific investment
shocks, i.e. fluctuations in the global economy. Finally, the variable P lt controls for the overall
impact of the real estate cycle on investment, irrespective of whether a firm owns real estate
or not. Shocks it are clustered at the State/MSA × year level. This correlation structure is
conservative given that the explanatory variable of interest RE V alueit is defined at the firm
level (see Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan [2004]).
As noted in Section 2.1.1, the market value of the entire real estate portfolio of a firm can
only be estimated before 1993, which is the last year for which accumulated depreciations on
buildings are available. RE V aluei1993 is thus defined as the initial market value of a firm’s
real estate assets, and subsequent variations in RE V alueit capture fluctuations in the market
values of these specific assets.19
Let us also highlight that the coefficient β measures how a firm’s investment responds to
each additional $1 of real estate the firm actually owns, and not how investment responds to
real estate shocks overall. This specification allows us to abstract from state-specific shocks that
would affect both firms with and without real estate assets.
Endogeneity Issues
There are two potential sources of endogeneity in the estimation of equation (1): (1) real estate
prices could be correlated with investment opportunities and (2) the ownership decision could
be related with investment opportunities.
There are two immediate reasons why real estate prices could be correlated with investment
opportunities. The first one is a simple reverse causality argument: large firms might have a
18In our online Appendix, we develop a simple model of investment under collateral constraint to justify this
specification. This version is available at www.princeton.edu/ dsraer/theoryRE.pdf.
19Using only the initial value of real estate in 1993 offers an additional advantage: if a firm discovers a profitable
investment opportunity, and if it leases some of its real estate, we may expect that its landlord will try to extract
as much rent as possible from this future investment; to escape from this hold-up problem, we may expect this
firm to become owner of its real estate exactly when it is about to invest; in such a scenario, we would then see a
spurious correlation between the current value of the real estate a firm owns and its investment. We circumvent
this problem by using variations in the value of real estate that come only from market prices, and not from the
contemporaneous strategy of the firm.
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non negligible impact through the demand for local labor and locally produced intermediates
on the local activity, so that an increase in investment for such large, land holding firms, could
trigger a real estate price appreciation. This would lead us to over-estimate β. Second, it could
be that our measure of real estate prices proxies for local demand shocks, and that, for some
reason, land holding firms are more sensitive to local demand.
To address this source of endogeneity, we instrument MSA level real estate prices. As already
mentioned in Section 2.2.2, we do so by interacting local housing elasticities with aggregate
shifts in the interest rate. When interest rates decrease, the demand for real estate increases.
If the local supply of land is very elastic, the increased demand will translate mostly into more
construction (more quantity) rather than higher land prices. If the supply of land is very inelastic
on the other hand, the increased demand will translate mostly into higher prices rather than
more construction. We expect that in MSAs where land supply is more constrained, a drop in
interest rate should have a larger impact on real estate prices (our first-stage regression). We
thus estimate, for MSA l, at date t, the following equation predicting real estate prices P lt :
P lt = α
l + δt + γ.Elasticity
l × IRt + ult (2)
where Elasticity measures constraints on land supply at the MSA level, IR is the nationwide
real interest rate at which banks refinance their home loans. αl is an MSA fixed effect, and δt
captures macroeconomic fluctuations in real estate prices, from which we want to abstract.
To further address this concern, we verify in Section 3.3 that our results are robust to
restricting our sample to small firms (bottom 3 quartiles of book value of assets) in large cities
(top 20 MSAs in terms of population). In those cases, we do not expect any individual firm to
have a sizable impact on local real estate prices through a general equilibrium feedback.
The second source of endogeneity in the estimation of equation (1) comes from the ownership
decision: if firms that are more likely to own real estate are also more sensitive to local demand
shocks, we would over-estimate β. As a first step in addressing this issue, we control for initial
characteristics of firm i, Xi, interacted with real estate prices Pmt . If those controls identify
characteristics that make firm i more likely to own real estate, and if those characteristics also
make firm i more sensitive to fluctuations in real estate prices, controlling for the interaction
between those controls and the contemporaneous real estate prices allows to separately identify
the collateral channel we are interested in.
The Xi are controls that we believe should play an important role in the ownership decision
and include 5 quintiles of Age, Assets and Return on Assets as well as 2-digit industry dummies
and State dummies. We show in Table 3 that these characteristics are good predictors of the
decision to buy real estate assets and, to a lesser extent, on the amount of real estate purchased.
Table 3 is a simple cross-sectional OLS regression of RE OWNER, a dummy equal to 1 when
the firm owns real estate, and RE V alue, the market value of the firm’s real estate assets, on
the initial characteristics mentioned above. Older, larger and more profitable firms, i.e. mature
firms, are more likely to be owners in our dataset.20
20Note that, from an intuitive perspective, these firms seem to be more likely to be insulated from local demand
shocks. This suggests that the hypothesis according to which land holding firms are inherently more likely to be
affected by local demand shocks is far from evident in the data.
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Controlling for the observed determinants of real estate ownership, we estimate the following
reduced form investment equation:







k × P lt + controlsit + it (3)
However, some determinants of the land holding decisions might not be observable, which
makes our approach in equation (3) insufficient. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find firm-level
instruments that predict real estate ownership. Yet, it is possible to control for firm-level
correlation between investment and real estate prices, as long as it is fixed over time. To do
so, we look in Section 3.6 at the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for firms that
are about to purchase a property, but before the purchase. If the unobserved characteristics
that co-determine investment and ownership is time invariant, then it should be the case that
firms that are about to purchase real estate assets are already more sensitive to the real estate
cycle. Section 3.6 shows that this is not the case, and describes the implementation of this
test in greater details. We insist however that while suggestive, this approach is by no means
definitive, as the unobserved heterogeneity could well vary over time, making the approach in
Section 3.6 irrelevant.
3.2 Main Results
Table 4 reports estimates of various specifications of equation (1) and (3). Column (1) starts
with the simplest estimation of equation (1) without any additional controls. Land holding firms
increase their investment more than non land holding firms when real estate prices increase. The
baseline coefficient is .077, so that each additional $1 of real estate collateral increases investment
by $.077. The coefficient is significant at the 1% confidence level. The effect is economically
large: a one s.d. increase in RE V alue increases investment by 28% of investment’s s.d.21
In Column (2), we add the initial controls interacted with real estate prices that account for
the observed heterogeneity in ownership decisions and its potential impact on the sensitivity of
investment to real estate prices. The coefficient is now .067, still significant at the 1% confidence
level, somewhat smaller but not statistically different from .077 found in column (1).
Column (3) adds state variables traditionally used in estimating investment equations, i.e.
Cash and Market to Book. Simple theory suggests that, if collateral constraints matter, the
estimated coefficient on RE V alue should decrease but remain positive. Intuitively, to leave
the Market-to-Book ratio unchanged after a positive shock to the value of the firm’s real estate
assets, there need to be a negative shock to unobserved productivity. This negative shock
to productivity generates a negative shock to investment. As a consequence, the response of
investment to the initial shock in real estate prices will be smaller than it would have been
had the Market-to-Book ratio not been controlled for.22 The reduced form sensitivity remains
positive but is now smaller, equal to .055.23 A one s.d. increase in collateral value explains a
21Increasing RE V alue by one s.d. (1.36) increases INV by .077 × 1.36 = .10, which represents 28% of
investment’s s.d. (.37).
22We derive this intuition formally in our simple model presented in the online appendix.
23In particular, in unreported regressions, we see that most of the drop in the sensitivity comes from adding
the control for the Market-to-Book ratio and not from adding Cash.
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20% s.d. increase in investment once the effect of the Market to Book and the other controls are
accounted for. Note that, as is traditional in the investment literature, both Cash and Market
to Book have a significant, positive impact on investment.
Column (4) replicates the estimation performed in Column (3) using the MSA-level residen-
tial price index instead of the State-level index. Using MSA level prices has both advantages
and drawbacks. It offers a more precise source of variation in real estate prices. It also makes
our identifying assumption that investment opportunities are uncorrelated with variations in
local prices milder. However, there are potentially larger measurement errors, as we now rely on
the assumption that all the real estate assets that a firm owns are located in the headquarters’
city. The results in Column (4) show that the coefficient remains stable, at .055.
Column (5) uses commercial real estate prices instead of residential prices. The lower number
of MSA’s with available commercial real estate prices reduces slightly the number of observations
(18,080 observations compared to 23,222 in the specification using MSA residential prices).
However, the sensitivity remains strongly positive and significant at the 1% level, and is slightly
higher than that computed using residential prices: a $1 increase in the value of commercial real
estate assets leads to an average increase of $.064 in investment.
Column (6) implements the I.V. strategy where real estate prices are instrumented using the
interaction of interest rates and local constraints on land supply (see Section 3.1). Let us first
briefly comment the first stage regressions, which are direct estimations of equation (2). These
estimations are presented in Table 5. The first two columns predict MSA residential prices,
while the two last columns predict MSA office prices. In column (1) and (3), we directly use the
measure of local housing supply elasticity provided in Saiz (2009). In column (2) and (4), we
group MSAs by quartile of local housing supply elasticity.
Low values of local housing supply elasticity correspond to MSAs with very constrained land
supply. We expect the positive effect of declining interest rates on prices to be stronger in MSAs
with less elastic supply. As expected, the γ coefficient in equation (2) is positive and significant
at the 1% confidence level. For instance, using the results in Column (4), a 100 basis points
interest rate decline increases the office price index by 6 percentage points more in “constrained”
cities (top quartile of the elasticity distribution) than in “unconstrained” cities (bottom quartile).
These effects are economically large, and significant. All F-tests for nullity of the instrument
are above 10 which leads us to conclude that these instruments are not weak.
Moving to the second stage equation, we simply use predicted prices P̂ lt from the estimation
of equation (2) and use them as an explanatory variable in equation 3.24 Column (6) in Table
4 reports the result of the estimation when the instrument used in the first stage is the local
24Because we construct our set of predicted prices on a different sample than the sample over which we run
our investment regression, we need to adjust our standard errors to account for this predicted regressor. In all
our IV specification, we thus report bootstrapped t-stats. The bootstrap has been done as follows: we first draw
a random sample with replacement within the sample of MSA-years; we run the first-stage regression on this
sample; we then draw another random sample with replacement within the sample of firm-years; to correct for
the correlation structure of this sample (MSA-year), this random draw is made at the MSA-year level, and not
at the firm-year level (i.e. we randomly draw with replacement a MSA-year and then select all the firms within
this MSA-year); we finally run our second-stage regression on this sample. We repeat this procedure 1000 times
and the standard-error we report is calculated from the empirical distribution of the coefficients estimated.
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housing supply elasticity (i.e. Column (3) of Table 5). The coefficient estimated from this IV
regression is very close to the one obtained from the OLS regression, equal to .065 and remains
significant at the 1% level.
Column (7) tests whether the relation between collateral value and investment found in
columns (1)-(5) depends on the shape of the empirical distribution of collateral values. To do
so, we interact the RE OWNER dummy (equal to 1 when a firm owns some real estate assets
in 1993) with the real estate price index. The estimated coefficient is positive and strongly
significant, indicating that our results are not driven by firms with large real estate holdings.
Of course, the interpretation of the coefficient on this dummy specification (RE OWNER)
is not directly comparable to the one with the continuous variable (RE V alue). While the
.064 coefficient in Column (5) means that a $1 increase in the value of a firm’s real estate
assets translates into a $.064 increase in investment, the .21 coefficient in Column (7) means
that, on average, a firm that owns at least some real estate increases its investment rate by 21
percentage points more than a firm that does not own real estate when the local price index
doubles (increases from 1 to 2). However, the economic magnitude implied by this dummy
specification is very similar to the specification that uses the value of real estate, as in column
(5). A one s.d. increase in the interaction between the dummy RE OWNER and land prices
(resp. RE V alue) increases investment by 22% (resp. 22%) of investments s.d.25
Column (8) implements the I.V. strategy on the dummy specification of column (7). In that
specification, the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices for owners versus non owners
increases almost two-fold, from .21 to .46. The estimated coefficient remains significant at the
1% confidence level.
3.3 Robustness checks
Table 6 provides various robustness checks of the baseline estimation of equation (3) in column
(5) of Table 4.
Column (1) and (2) reproduce the estimation on two different subsample periods: before
1999 in column (1), and after 2000 in column (2). A potential issue with pooled regressions as
the ones presented in Table 4 is that they might conceal a fair amount of heterogeneity in the
elasticity over time. We find that the estimated coefficients are significant in both sub-periods.
The estimated coefficient βˆ is only marginally higher before 1999 than after 2000 (.085 versus
.084), and not statistically different. Neither the significance nor the magnitude of the coefficient
of interest does seem to come from some particular years in our sample.
Column (3) estimates equation (3) on a sub-sample of small firms in large MSA’s. This
specification addresses the concern of reverse causality, whereby a large firm’s investment may
increase local real estate prices. We consider only firms in the lower three quartiles of size (book
value of assets), and in the top 20 MSAs in terms of population. The estimated coefficient
25The coefficient β for the dummy specification in Column (7) is .21, and one standard deviation of the RHS
variable RE Owner×MSA office prices is .39, so that .21×.39 ≈ .082 represents 22.1% of investment’s s.d. (equal
to .37). The coefficient β for the comparable continuous specification in Column (5) is .064, and one standard
deviation of the RHS variable RE V alue is 1.26, so that .064× 1.26 ≈ .081 represents 21.8% of investment’s s.d
(.37).
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remains significant at the 1% confidence level, and is only marginally smaller than, but not
statistically different from, the coefficient estimated on the entire sample (.061 compared to
.064).
Column (4) uses as a dependent variable variations in PPE net of variations in real estate.
One possible concern may be that investment includes investment in real estate assets. If a firm
were to systematically acquire real estate assets when real estate prices increase, and all the
more so if that firm already owns more real estate, one would mechanically find a coefficient
β.26 Removing any acquisition or sales of real estate from investment addresses this concern.
The estimated coefficient remains large and significant at the 1% level.27
Column (5) uses as a dependent variable the average investment over the subsequent three
years, as opposed to the current investment over a single year. One may expect that in the
presence of collateral constraints, the renegotiation of debt contract with lenders following an
appreciation of a firm’s real estate may be gradual. As expected, the coefficient increases from
$.064 to $.09 of investment for each additional $1 of collateral. In her study of 1990s Japan, Jie
Gan (2007a) finds a .8 percentage points decrease in investment for a 10% drop in real estate
value. In our context, we obtain that a 10% decrease in REV alue around its sample mean
(0.083 ppoints) leads to an investment reduction by .09× 8.3 = .7 percentage points. The two
estimates are remarkably close.
Column (6) uses as dependent variable the investment of firm i adjusted for the overall
investment of firms in i’s 2-digit SIC code. Such a specification addresses the concern that
investment may be concentrated in specific sectors where firms tend to own their real estate,
and that those sectors may have been concentrated in areas that experienced large real estate
price inflation. The coefficient of interest remains unchanged at $.064 of investment per $1 of
collateral, and remains significant at the 1% level.
Column (7) uses the entire sample of firms, without restricting our attention to firms that
were present in our sample in 1993. This specification addresses the possible concern that
selection and survivorship bias may lead to biased estimates. Of course, as explained in Section
2.1.1, the information on the accumulated depreciation on buildings that we use to construct
the market value of real estate assets is not available after 1993. For firms that enter our dataset
after 1993, we only know whether they own real estate or not, but not the market value of their
real estate assets. We therefore re-estimate the dummy specification of equation (3), but using
the extended sample. The results of this regression in column (7) of Table 6 are to be compared
to the similar regression in column (7) of Table 4. The coefficient of interest is unchanged (.21),
and remains statistically significant at the 1% level in this unrestricted sample.
Column (8) uses the information on whether a firm actually owns its headquarters directly
from the 10K files for the year 1997.28 The collection of this data is described in Section 2.3.
26In unreported regressions, we verify directly that firms do not seem to follow such a strategy for their
acquisition of real estate.
27Note that yearly variations in PPE are not directly comparable to investment, as they do not account for
the depreciation of physical capital. We use as a dependent variable the difference between changes in PPE and
changes in real estate assets, which are comparable to each other.
2810K files become available only in 1997.
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Unfortunately, the 10K files do not provide us with information on the value of a firm’s real
estate, but only on whether a firm owns its headquarters or not. We therefore estimate the
same dummy specification of equation (3) as in Column (7) of Table 4 or Column (7) of Table
6. The coefficient of interest drops somewhat from .21 to .18, but it remains significant at the
1% level.29
Finally, we also estimate all the regressions presented in Table 6 using the IV strategy where
real estate prices are instrumented on the interaction of interest rates and local constraints on
land supply (see Section 3.1). The results are essentially unchanged.30
3.4 Heterogeneous Responses: Ex Ante Credit Constraints
As pointed out in a different context by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), it is unclear a priori that
the sensitivity of investment to collateral value should be increasing with the extent of credit
constraints. This remains ultimately an empirical question which we answer using three different
ex ante measures of credit constraints based on: (1) dividend payments (2) firm size and (3)
credit rating. Those measures are defined in Section 2.1.3. We estimate equation (3) separately
for “constrained” and “unconstrained” firms.
As reported on Table 7, there is a strong cross-sectional heterogeneity in the response of
investment to balance sheet shocks. The sensitivity of investment to collateral value is on average
twice as large in the group of “constrained” firms relative to the group of “unconstrained” firms.
For instance, the coefficient β for firms in the bottom 3 deciles of the size distribution is .093
compared to .045 for the firms in the top 3 deciles. The difference between these two coefficients
is significant at the 1% level for all three measures of credit constraints.
The results are similar when instrumenting real estate prices using the interaction of interest
rates and local constraints on land supply.31
3.5 Collateral and Debt
In this Section, we try to explore the channel through which firms are able to convert capital
gains on real estate assets into further investment. In unreported regressions, we investigate
whether firms, when confronted with an increase in the value of their real estate assets, are
more likely to sell them and cash out the capital gains. We do not find it to be the case. This
implies that outside financing has to increase to explain the observed increase in investment.
Standard theories of investment with collateral constraints (as, e.g. in Hart and Moore (1994))
would predict that collateral value leads to more or larger issues of new debt, secured on the
appreciated value of land holdings.
Table 8 reports results of the effect of an increase in land value on debt issues, using COM-
PUSTAT data. To simplify interpretations and minimize endogeneity issues, we remove the
Cash and Market/Book controls from equation (3), and replace investment on the right hand
29Since a firm may own some other property beyond its headquarters in the MSA of its headquarter, this drop
in the coefficient estimate is expected.
30The results from the IV estimations are available from the authors upon request.
31The results from the IV estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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side with debt issues and debt repayments:
DebtIssueslit = αi + δ
l
t + β.RE V alueit + 
l
it (4)
To obtain estimates comparable to investment results, our debt issues variables are normal-
ized by lagged tangible fixed assets (PPE). Thus, the results obtained when estimating equation
(4) should be compared with the coefficient β derived in Column (2) of Table 4, i.e. .067.
The results are presented in Table 8. Columns (1) and (2) look at the inflows and outflows
of debt. We find that land holding firms make larger debt issuances and repayments when
the value of their real estate increases. A $1 increase in collateral value increases debt issues
by $.012 and debt repayments by $.065. The difference between the two, i.e. net debt issues
as presented in column (3), increases by $.038, in the same range as the observed increase in
investment. The fact that both repayment and issues increase when collateral value increases
suggests that firms take advantage of the appreciated value of their collateral to renegotiate
former debt contracts, reimbursing former loans and issuing new, cheaper ones. If this were the
case, the marginal interest rates of companies with increasing collateral value should decrease.
Unfortunately, COMPUSTAT only reports a noisy measure of average interest rates, preventing
us from testing this natural interpretation of the results. A potential worry with results in
Column (1) to (3) is that flows data (i.e. issuances and repayments) are of a lower quality than
stock data (i.e. the level of long-term debt). Column (4) confirms the robustness of these results
by looking at yearly variations in the stock of long-term debt. The reported coefficient (.043) is
similar to that in Column (3).
On the short-term liability side, lines of credits might be easier to obtain when secured on
valuable collateral (e.g. Sufi, 2009). However, we observe only a small, positive and slightly
significant net increase in short term debts, with a coefficient of $.0044 per $1. Borrowers are
more likely to use longer-term liabilities to finance their additional investment.
The results are similar when instrumenting real estate prices using the interaction of interest
rates and local constraints on land supply.32
3.6 Are Real Estate Purchasers different from Non-Purchasers?
The decision by firms to own real estate assets on their balance sheet is not random. This can
introduce a bias in the various regressions we have presented so far. For instance, if firms with
more cyclical strategies were to own their real estate properties – for a reason we do not model
here – the estimated β would be upward-biased.
In this section, we show that our results are robust to assuming a time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity across firms that would affect both the real estate ownership and the sensitivity
of investment to real estate prices. Our test consists in estimating the sensitivity of investment
to real estate prices for firms that purchase a property both before and after this acquisition.
We find that, before the acquisition, future owners are statistically indistinguishable from firms
that never own real estate. Yet, these firms behave like other real-estate holding firms after they
acquire their properties.
To implement this idea we do not rely on the market value of the real estate assets, but only
on whether firms own real estate or not. This allows us to work with a longer sample, as we
32The results from the IV estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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do not require information on buildings depreciations. These results are to be compared to the
dummy specification presented in column (7) of Table 4.
The sample period is 1984 to 2007, 1984 being the year when information on real estate assets
appears in COMPUSTAT. We start with a sample of all COMPUSTAT firms that are not in
the Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Construction or Mining Industries, that are not involved
in major takeovers, and that have at least three consecutive years of appearance in the data.
We define a firm as a purchaser if it initially has no positive real estate assets on its balance
sheet and positive real estate assets after some date.33 We exclude from our sample firms that
move several time between 0 and positive real estate assets, i.e. multiple acquirers. We also
require that the firm has at least three years of available data before and after the purchase of
the real estate asset. We end up with a sample of 876 purchasers and 11,083 purchaser-year
observations, with purchasing date ranging from 1986 to 2005. The number of purchaser-year
observations before the purchase is 4,733. The group of non-purchaser is defined as those firms
that always report no real estate assets throughout their history in COMPUSTAT. This leaves
us with a sample of 2,742 firms and 15,842 firm year observations for non-purchasers.
We first estimate equation (1) separately for non purchasers and for purchasers before the
purchase of land. The results are presented in Table 9, Columns (1) and (2). If anything,
purchasers have, prior to acquiring real estate, a lower sensitivity of investment to real estate
prices than non-purchasers. More importantly, neither sensitivities nor the difference between
these two sensitivities are statistically different from 0. Future owners are statistically indis-
tinguishable from non-owners before they acquire land. The data rejects the existence of a
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that would simultaneously affect real estate ownership
and investment sensitivity to the local real estate cycle. If the decision to own land is endoge-
nous to our problem, it has to be for time-varying reasons. For instance, firms could decide to
buy real estate anticipating that their investment opportunities will be more correlated with the
local real estate cycle, creating a bias in the estimation.
The sample of purchasers also allows to confirm the findings in Section 3.2 by investigating
the within dimension of the data. In order to do so, we also estimate equation (1) for purchasers
after they acquire real estate assets. The results are presented in Column (3) of Table 9. The
sensitivity of investment to real estate prices is .4 for purchasers once they become land holders,
and it is significant at the 1% level. Relative to Column (2), we see that purchasing real estate
is associated with a .52 increase in the sensitivity of investment to real estate prices. This
difference is significant at the 3% level. This difference between owners and non owners is larger
but not statistically different from the comparable coefficient (.21) in Column (7) of Table 4.34
Column (4), (5) and (6) of Table 9 run the same regressions as in Column (1), (2) and (3)
using variations in long-term debt as a dependent variable. The sensitivity of debt issues to
local real estate prices for land-holding firms is not significantly different from that of future
owners before they purchase their real estate assets (Column (4) and (5)). Debt issues become
33Before 1995, many firms have missing real estate data in COMPUSTAT. To maximize the number of pur-
chasers, we define as a purchaser a firm that has initially missing real estate observations, then 0 real estate
assets and then positive real estate assets for the remaining years.
34As the estimation corresponds to a specification with a RE OWNER dummy variable, the natural bench-
mark is that of Column (7) in Table 4
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significantly more sensitive to local real estate prices after firms acquire land (Column (6)).
Overall, the analysis in this section confirms that our main results on investment and debt
issuance do not seem to be caused by a time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that would
simultaneously affect real estate ownership and investment or debt sensitivity to the local real
estate.
3.7 A Closer Look at the Real Estate Bubble
In this Section, we investigate the impact of the recent surge of real estate prices between 2000
and 2006 on corporate investment. This allows us to (1) further test the robustness of our results
and (2) provide a simple illustration of the methodology used in this paper. This Section follows
closely the methodology outlined in Mian and Sufi (2009) and is similar in spirit to that in Gan
(2007a).
We divide the sample between MSAs with high and low local housing supply elasticity
(fourth vs. first quartile), and between firms owning vs. renting real estate. In order to
reduce the extent of measurement errors (see Section 2.3), we use here the information on HQ
ownership collected from 10K filings in 2000. We thus assume here that headquarters represent
a significant fraction of the non-specific real estate assets held by corporations and restrict
the identification on headquarters ownership only. We then simply compare the evolution of
investment of headquarters’ owners vs. renters in cities with high vs. low elasticities.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of office prices from 2000 to 2006 depending on the MSA local
housing supply elasticity. It confirms that, while the bubble had a more dramatic impact on
residential prices, it did also affect commercial prices. Low elasticity MSAs experienced a much
larger increase in office prices (30% increase in 2 years) than high elasticity MSAs. Figure
2 implements our methodology looking at total capital expenditures since 2000, normalized
by assets in 2000. In low elasticity MSAs, firms owning their headquarters experienced a 4
percentage points higher growth in capital expenditure (blue line) relative to firms renting
their headquarters. By contrast, in high elasticities MSAs, there is no statistically significant
difference in the evolution of assets of firms owning their headquarters relative to firms renting
them (red line). If anything, owners saw a smaller increase in capital expenditure than renters
(by about 2 percentage points). Figure 3 leads to similar conclusions on long-term debt: firms
owning their headquarters in low elasticity MSAs took advantage of the real estate price bubble
to increase their stock of debt relative to firms in similar MSAs but renting headquarters and
relative to MSAs where the bubble did not have a large impact on office prices.
Table 10 confirms these graphical evidence using firm-level regressions. We adopt a standard
long-run difference-in-difference strategy and estimate the following equation:
CAPEX00−06im
Assets00im
= αm + β
∆(Office Price)00−06m
Office Price00m









is the sum, for firm i, of capital expenditures from 2000 to 2006, normalized




is, for MSA m, the cumulative office price growth from 2000
to 2006. Finally, Headquartersi is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i owns its headquarters in 2000,
as reported in its 10K filings of that year.
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Column (1) in Table 10 directly estimates equation (5). The results from this dummy
specification using the information from the 10K files are to be compared to Column (8) of
Table 6. The .17 coefficient suggests that in response to a 10% real estate price increase, a firm
that owns its headquarters will increase its investment rate by 1.7 percentage point more than
a renting firm. The coefficient obtained through focusing on the 2000s is two times larger than
our previous estimates (and than estimates of Gan, 2007a).
Column (2) replaces the local office price growth by the local housing supply elasticity:
this corresponds to the reduced form of an instrumental variable regression where local prices
are instrumented by local housing elasticity. As expected, since the higher the local housing
elasticity, the lower the increase in local land prices, we find a negative sign on the interaction
between housing elasticity and the owner dummy: in MSAs with a high housing elasticity, price
increases have been moderate, and there is not much difference in the investment of owners
compared to renters; in MSAs with a low housing elasticity, price increases have been dramatic,
and owners increase their investment more than renters
Column (3) augments the previous regression in Column (2) by controlling for initial firm
size. This is natural as there is a fair amount of heterogeneity between firms that own versus
rent their headquarters.
Column (4) uses quartiles of local housing supply elasticity instead of the elasticity itself.
Finally, Columns (5)-(8) replicate the regressions in Columns (1)-(4), replacing cumulative




) as the dependent variable.
Overall, the results in Table 10 confirm the analysis of Figures 2 and 3. Firms owning their
headquarters experienced a significantly larger growth in assets and long-term debt relative to
renters, especially so in MSAs where office prices increased a lot, i.e. in MSAs with lower housing
supply elasticity. This effect is monotonic in the local housing supply elasticity.
4 Conclusion
When the value of a firm’s real estate appreciates by $1, its investment increases by approx-
imately $.06. This investment is financed through additional debt issues. The impact of real
estate shocks on investment is stronger when estimated on a group of firms which are more
likely to be credit constrained. As we showed in this paper, real estate represents a significant
fraction of the assets held on the balance sheet of corporations. As a consequence, one could
expect the impact of real estate shocks on aggregate investment to be non-trivial. However, this
is not necessarily the case in a world where responses to balance sheet shocks are heterogeneous.
In particular, small firms respond more than large firms, which attenuates the aggregate impact
of credit constraints. Understanding how one can go from the micro estimates we offer in this
paper to the macro impact of real estate shocks on investment, and therefore on GDP, remains
unclear. We hope to tackle this question in future research.
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A Figures and Tables



























2000 2002 2004 2006
year
Low elasticity High Elasticity
Note: This figure shows the average office price index (normalized to 1 in 2000) for MSAs in the bottom
quartile of land supply elasticity (“Low Elasticity MSA”) in blue and MSAs in the top quartile of land
supply elasticity (“High Elasticity MSA”) in red.
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year
Low Elasticity MSA High Elasticity MSA
relative accumulated capex (owner vs. renter)
Note: This figure shows, for each year between 2000 and 2006, the difference between the average
accumulated capex of headquarter owners minus the average accumulated capex of headquarter renters,
for MSAs in the bottom quartile of land supply elasticity (“Low Elasticity MSA”) in blue and MSAs in
the top quartile of land supply elasticity (“High Elasticity MSA”) in red. Accumulated capex is defined
as 0 in 2000, and then as the sum of all capex made by the firm between 2001 and the current year,
normalized by assets in 2000.
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2000 2002 2004 2006
year
Low Elasticity MSA High Elasticity MSA
relative debt growth (owner vs. renter)
Note: This figure shows, for each year between 2000 and 2006, the difference between total debt growth
of headquarter owners minus total debt growth of headquarter renters, for MSAs in the bottom quartile
of land supply elasticity (“Low Elasticity MSA”) in blue and MSAs in the top quartile of land supply
elasticity (“High Elasticity MSA”) in red. Debt growth is defined as 0 in 2000, and then as the sum of












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: 10k Headquarter Ownership and Compustat Real Estate Ownership
No HQ ownership in 10k HQ ownership in 10k
No RE in COMPUSTAT 1,572 34
> 0 RE in COMPUSTAT 1,024 806
Notes: This table presents the cross-tabulation of headquarter ownership in the 1997 10k file and real estate
ownership in COMPUSTAT for COMPUSTAT firms in 1997. “> 0 RE in COMPUSTAT” means that the firm
reports some real estate ownership in COMPUSTAT in 1997 and “No RE in COMPUSTAT” means that the firm
reports no real estate assets in 1997 in COMPUSTAT. “No HQ ownership in 10k” means that the firm reports
that it leases its headquarter(s) in its 1997 10k file. “HQ ownership in 10k” means that the firm reports that it
owns its headquarter(s) in its 1997 10k file.
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Table 3: Determinants of Real Estate Ownership
RE OWNER RE Value (State)
(1) (2)
2nd Quintile of Asset .15*** .067
(7) (1)
3rd Quintile of Asset .31*** .14**
(14) (2)
4th Quintile of Asset .49*** .3***
(20) (4)
5th Quintile of Asset .51*** .072
(18) (.84)
2nd Quintile of ROA .11*** .33***
(4.9) (4.8)
3rd Quintile of ROA .14*** .26***
(6.1) (3.7)
4th Quintile of ROA .12*** .17**
(5.4) (2.4)
5th Quintile of ROA .11*** .21***
(5) (3.1)
2nd Quintile of Age .045** .0067
(2.1) (.1)
3rd Quintile of Age .11*** .13**
(5.5) (2)
4th Quintile of Age .24*** .49***
(11) (7.5)
5th Quintile of Age .25*** .91***
(11) (13)
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes
State Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Observations 2,742 2,742
Adj. R2 .56 .27
Notes: This table shows the determinant of Real Estate Ownership in 1993. The dependent variable is RE
OWNER (Column (1)), a dummy indicating whether the firm reports any real estate asset on its balance sheet
in 1993 and RE Value (Column (2)), the market value of real estate assets in 1993. Control variables include 5
quintiles of Asset, Age, ROA, as well as Industry and State Fixed Effects. T-stats in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
means statistically different from zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
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Table 4: Real Estate Prices and Investment Behavior
Capital Expenditure
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (OLS) (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE Value (State Residential Prices) .077*** .067*** .055***
(15) (13) (12)
RE Value (MSA Residential Prices) .055***
(11)
RE Value (MSA Office Prices) .064*** .065***
(9) (5.5)
RE OWNER × MSA Office Prices .21*** .46***
(3.2) (2.8)
State Residential Prices -.1* -.8** -.38
(-1.7) (-2.1) (-1.1)
MSA Residential Prices -.46
(-1.3)
MSA Office Prices .88 .46 .73 .57
(1.3) (.15) (1.1) (.01)
Cash .017*** .017*** .016*** .016*** .016*** .016***
(6.2) (6.5) (5.5) (3.0) (5.5) (3.1)
Market/Book .062*** .062*** .065*** .064*** .066*** .065***
(18) (19) (18) (9.4) (18) (10.4)
Initial Controls × State Residential Prices No Yes Yes No No No No No
Initial Controls × MSA Residential Prices No No No Yes No No No No
Initial Controls × MSA Office Prices No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,670 27,496 24,528 23,222 18,080 17,862 18,313 18,014
Adj. R2 .27 .29 .32 .32 .32 .32 .31 .32
Notes: This table reports the empirical link between the value of real estate assets and investment. The dependent variable is
capital expenditure (item # 128 normalized by lagged item #8). Column (1), (2) and (3) use the state-level residential price index.
Column (4) uses MSA-level residential prices, while Column (5),(6) and (7) use MSA-level office prices. Except for column (1),
all regressions control for firm-level initial characteristics (5 quintiles of age, asset and ROA as well as 2-digit industry and state
of location) interacted with Real Estate Prices. All regressions, except Column (1) and (2) control for Cash and previous year
Market/Book. Column (6) and (8) present IV estimates where MSA office prices are instrumented using the interaction of real
mortgage rate interacted with the local elasticity of land supply taken from Saiz (2010) (See column (3) in Table 5 for the first stage
regressions). All specifications use year and firm fixed effects and cluster observations at the state-year or MSA-year level. In the
IV specifications in Columns (6) and (8), standard errors are bootstrapped within MSA-year clusters. T-stats are in parenthesis. ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ means statistically different from zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
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Table 5: First-Stage Regression: the Impact of Local Housing Supply Elasticity on Housing
Prices
MSA Residential Prices MSA Office Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Housing Supply Elasticity×Mortgage Rate .028*** .036***
(6.3) (5)
First Quartile of Elasticity×Mortgage Rate -.064*** -.066***
(-8.9) (-5.1)
Second Quartile of Elasticity×Mortgage Rate -.046*** -.033**
(-6) (-2)
Third Quartile of Elasticity×Mortgage Rate -.014** -.0097
(-2.2) (-.41)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1358 1358 804 804
Adj. R2 .94 .94 .84 .84
Notes: This table investigates how local housing supply elasticity, as defined by Saiz (2009), affects real estate
prices. The dependent variable is the real estate price index, defined at the MSA level – Column (1) and (2) –
and the MSA office price index – Column (3) and (4). Column (1) and (3) use directly the local housing supply
elasticity, while Column (2) and (4) use quartiles of the elasticity. All regressions control for year as well as MSA
fixed effects and cluster observations at the MSA level. T-stats in parenthesis∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ means statistically
different from zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.
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